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CHANGING AND/OR FUNDING OPEB PROMISES: A TYPOLOGY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO GASB 4 5 AND THE
REALIZATION OF OPEB LIABILITIES
Juita Elena (Wie) Yusuf and Thomas Musumeci*

ABSTRACT. GASB Statement No. 45 addresses how governmental units
account for employees' other post-employment benefits (OPEB), requiring
government employers to replace OPEB reporting on a pay-as-you-go basis
with an accounting of the cost of current and future benefits. This
requirement and the resulting OPEB liability may prompt government
employers to reconsider key questions regarding their OPEB provision. The
size of the OPEB liability depends on both the benefit promises made to
employees and the assets to fund these promises. We propose a typology
that defines four approaches for governments to respond to GASB 45 and
their OPEB liabilities. These approaches represent different combinations of
strategies involving OPEB promises and assets. We illustrate these
strategies and responses using selected counties and nine mid-Atlantic
cities.

INTRODUCTION
In June 2004, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) issued Statement No. 45 (GASB 45) Accounting and Financial
Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other than
Pensions to require clear and transparent reporting of the current
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value of other post-employment benefits (OPEB) promises in state
and local government financial statements. These OPEB are defined
as non-pension benefits provided after an individual leaves
employment They primarily include retiree healthcare, and often
dental, vision, and prescription drug plans, but possibly also life
insurance, disability, long-term care, and legal services if they are
provided separately from a defined benefit pension plan. Given that
health benefits are by far both the predominant and the most costly
OPEB for government employers, our research focuses primarily on
retiree health benefits.
OPEB have traditionally been reported and paid for on a pay-asyou-go (PAYGO) basis.
GASB 45, however, established new
accounting standards for state and local governments as employers,
requiring them to measure, recognize, and disclose the cost of their
OPEB in their financial reports. Compliance with GASB 45 reporting
guidelines provides employers with an understanding of their OPEB
actuarial liability exposure.
While intended solely as an accounting standard, GASB 45 may
significantly affect the funding, sponsorship, and design of OPEB.
This paper focuses on local government responses to GASB 45 and
the information it discloses regarding OPEB liability, and summarizes
decisions made by selected county and city governments in response
to the realization of the magnitude of their OPEB liabilities following
compliance with GASB 45. This focus on local governments is critical,
as of the over 89,000 local governments in the US, approximately 77
percent provide OPEB to their retirees (Bell, 2006).
We ask the following research question:
How have local
governments in the U.S. responded to GASB 45 and the resulting
information about unfunded OPEB liabilities?
Answering this
research question is timely given the recent implementation of GASB
45. It is also relevant given the potential size of OPEB liabilities.
Coupled with the current fiscal crisis, OPEB liabilities may prompt
local governments to re-think the fundamental question of whether to
continue to provide OPEB. Our research examines the decisions
made by local governments regarding the continued sponsorship of
retiree healthcare benefits, prefunding of such benefits, and
subsequent benefit plan redesign and other cost cutting strategies to
accommodate continued sponsorship in the face of significant
liabilities and annual funding requirements. We illustrate, using a
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four-cell typology, how local governments have responded to the
informational content of GASB 45. We frame these responses in
terms of changing OPEB promises and/or building assets to fulfill
these promises.
We begin with a brief overview of GASB 45 and discuss the
potential impacts of GASB 45 on government employers. Against this
backdrop we introduce four possible categories of responses to GASB
45. These responses involve different combinations of prefunding
OPEB and maintaining benefit levels. We illustrate these responses
using a study of counties by the National Center for the Study of
Counties (NCSC) and examples of nine mid-Atlantic cities. We
highlight how some local governments' responses to GASB 45 have
resulted in reduced OPEB.
BACKGROUND ON GASB 45

GASB 45 is the governmental equivalent to Financial Accounting
Standards Board Statement 106 (FAS 106) and International
Accounting Standards Board Statement 19 (lASB 19). GASB 45 was
partly motivated by economic and demographic factors, such as the
impending baby boomers' retirement and escalating healthcare costs
that threaten to significantly increase the costs to government
employers for retiree benefits (Marlowe, 2008). The traditional
PAYGO approach to OPEB can result in inadequately prefunded
benefits that may in turn contribute to mounting deferred liabilities
and potentially adverse effects on the fiscal health of government
entities. The importance of GASB 45 was spurred by most subnational governments' not reporting or disclosing in their financial
documents information pertaining to the amount of their OPEB
obligations, making it impossible for the public to determine the true
cost for government of providing these benefits.
OPEB costs have traditionally been accounted for and funded on
a PAYGO basis, with current year benefits and administrative costs
paid out of current revenue. In establishing Statement No. 45, GASB
(2004) noted that the PAYGO approach and its related reporting
failed to (1) recognize the cost of benefits when the exchange of
benefits and service takes place, (2) provide information about the
actuarial accrued liabilities for promised benefits and the extent to
which these benefits have been funded, and (3) provide information
needed to assess potential demands on future cash flows. In
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essence, the probiem with the PAYGO approach is that it allows
governments to ignore future expenses associated with benefits
promised to retirees, and to underreport substantial accumulated
liabilities that have been incurred and will be incurred in the future.
GASB 45 was driven by two inter-related issues (Governmental
Accounting Standards Board, n.d.). First was the lack of reporting
and information about the nature and size of long-term OPEB
obligations and commitments, and second was the incomplete
information with which to assess the cost of government and to
analyze the financial position and long-run financial health of
government. GASB 45 addressed concerns that the PAYGO approach
was "not transparent and obscured the magnitude of government
employers' financial obligation ... [and] the funded status of postretirement obligations was not disclosed and was not recognized on
the financial statements" (Bell, 2006, p. 29).
OPEB are a form of deferred compensation and should be
recognized and recorded as the benefits are earned, rather than
recognized in the future when the benefits are paid (Mead, 2008).
GASB 45 establishes an amortization period so government
employers can account for the cost of OPEB over the active service
life of employees. From an informational perspective, GASB 45
dictates that employers offering defined benefit OPEB plans must
measure and disclose their long-term OPEB costs and the extent to
which the employers have contributed to meet those costs. In
summary, GASB 45 requires that government employers produce
statements for their OPEB using generally accepted accounting
principles that present the estimated actuarial accrued liabilities and
the annual required contributions necessary to cover the liabilities. In
much the same way as GASB Statement No. 43 changed how subnational governments report the liabilities associated with their
pension plans, GASB 45 changes how state and local governments
report the liabilities associated with their OPEB plans.
Informational Components of GASB 45
According to Wisniewski, "the new OPEB standards provide
information about whether and to what extent promised benefits
have been funded, as well as information about the potential impact
by such benefits on the employer's future cash flow" (2005, p. 106).
GASB 45 can "[p]rovide information useful in assessing potential
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demands
on
the
employer's
future
cash
flows"
(http://www.gasb.org/st/summary/gstsm45.html).
It requires the
measurement, recognition, and reporting of annual OPEB costs on an
accrual accounting basis, which allows for the systematic and rational
allocation of the present value of the OPEB over the working life of
employees.
The determination of the OPEB costs and liabilities begins with
calculating the annual required contribution (ARC). There are two
components to the ARC. The first is the employer's normal costs or
the present value of providing one year of the OPEB to all qualifying
retirees. The second component of the ARC is the amortized costs of
the OPEB liability. These amortized costs represent "[t]he portion of
the actuarial present value allocated to prior years of employment
and thus not provided for by normal costs in the current or future
years" (Mead 2008, p. 290). The actuarial accrued liability (AAL) is
the total amount of the OPEB earned by employees up to the date
that GASB 45 is implemented and is amortized over thirty years. It
represents "the amount that the organization should have been
contributing in the periods prior to the implementation of the OPEB
standard" (Voorhees, 2005, p. 64).
Compliance with GASB 45 also involves determining the
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) which is the amount by
which the actuarial value of the OPEB plan assets exceeds the AAL
For governments using PAYGO, the UAAL will be equal to the AAL as
the OPEB plan will have no assets. The UAAL can also be defined as
the cumulative annual ARC short- falls.
The content of the information resulting from GASB 45 is
daunting. Given that many governments have traditionally relied on
the PAYGO approach to finance their OPEB, GASB 45 was expected to
result in reporting of significant, eye-opening, unfunded liabilities.
McKethan et al. (2006) reported that the AAL could amount to as
much as $ 1 trillion nationwide. Keating and Berman (2007) cited
estimates of OPEB liabilities in the $ 1 trillion (McTague, 2006) to
$1.5 trillion (Zion & Varshney, 2007) range. Estimates by the
Government Accountability Office (2007) showed an aggregate state
and local government unfunded liability of between $500 billion and
$1.6 trillion. Research by Credit Suisse estimated that the 25 largest
cities had unfunded OPEB liabilities of over $90 billion (Zion &
Varshney, 2007). OPEB liabilities for the City of Los Angeles alone
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were projected to be $93 billion, equivalent to $8,000 per resident
(Marlowe, 2008). More recently, Coggburn and Kearney (2010)
provided data on OPEB liabilities of individual states, which ranged
from effectively $0 to $68 billion. Fourteen states had OPEB
liabilities in excess of $10 billion.
Clearly these liabilities, and the resulting funding requirements,
can have serious consequences for governmental balance sheets,
just as the implication of FAS 106 discussed next had serious
consequences for the balance sheets of many private companies.
POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO GASB 45 AND THE SUBSEQUENST REALIZATION
OF OPEB LIABILITIES

GASB 45 brings public sector accounting practices in closer
alignment with the private sector pension accounting rules instituted
in response to several highly publicized private sector pension fund
collapses. Hurley et al. (2006) viewed GASB 45 as the public sector
equivalent of FAS 106, to which many attributed a steep decline in
private sector retiree healthcare benefits (Patterson, 2001).
Learning from the FAS 106 Experience
Pearson and Jerris (1995) argued that including liability reporting
for OPEB reduced healthcare and other benefits received by private
sector employees and retirees. FAS 106 became effective December
15, 1992, and statistics show that the private sector has since seen
decreasing retiree health benefits. In 1997, 22 percent of private
sector employers provided retiree health benefits, but by 2002, only
13 percent provided such benefits (Kilgour, 2009). Other studies
documented this positive relationship between reduction in benefits
and the implementation of FAS 106 (Mittelstaedt, Nichols, & Regier,
1995; Binnis & Riffe, 2000).
The private sector experience with FAS 106 suggests that despite
its intended role as simply an accounting and reporting standard that
requires government employers to recognize OPEB costs, GASB 45
could result in these government employers reducing or even
eliminating their OPEB. Kilgour suggested that "the major short run
impact of GASB 45 will be to pressure employers to reduce costs by
reducing retiree health and other benefits by curtailing access and
benefit levels and shifting more of their cost to retirees" (2009, p.
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32). Therefore, while GASB 45 is an accounting standard and does
not mandate how a governmental entity conducts its operations,
"[cjonsideration of the information produced by the application of the
standard may encourage ... governments to think about reducing
such benefit programs (and their associated liabilities) in the future"
(Wiesnewski, 2005, p. 115).
Coggburn and Kearney (2010) argued that while GASB 45 has
made OPEB costs more transparent, the resulting unfunded liabilities
have prompted a concern "over the sustainability of many
government benefit plans" (p. 106). Many of the questions being
addressed by government employers today are equivalent to those
resulting from FAS 106. These companies had to consider the
sustainability of continuing to provide retiree healthcare benefits in
their existing forms, and subsequently what types of plan design
changes or cost control measures could be instituted and how they
would be instituted. Companies also had to consider whether to
prefund their retiree healthcare plans and how much to prefund.
Both sets of questions are examined in this study. The former focuses
on whether to continue providing OPEB and if so, what types of
changes might be made to the OPEB plan. These questions are
important because they affect the assumptions underpinning the
OPEB actuarial valuation, which may result in "nontrivial differences"
in the OPEB liabilities (Marlowe, 2008, p. 216). The latter question of
prefunding deals with building the assets base for addressing future
liabilities. The responses to these questions are important because
they determine the extent of OPEB liability underfunding.
Changing OPEB Promises: Continuing OPEB Provision and At What
Levels?

As private sector employers dealt with FAS 106, some considered
discontinuing their retiree healthcare benefits or ending participation
for future retirees or new hires. Several companies implemented
changes to their OPEB plans, affecting benefit levels, eligibility, and
the cost sharing relationship. Some private employers began to tie
their retiree healthcare benefits to greater lengths of service with the
company or introduced graded vesting and accruing retiree
healthcare benefits over the employees' working careers. Other
elements of plan design that came under scrutiny were the provision
of full benefits to spouses at no cost, the provision of full benefits at
younger retirement ages, and the level of benefits provided (Feldman
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& Haynes, 2007). To ameliorate the financial impact of FAS 106,
some companies capped the amount the employer would contribute
toward retiree healthcare benefits. Also to reduce their financial
burden, employers shifted away from a defined benefit (DB) plan to a
defined contribution (DC) plan. These approaches had the key
advantage of reducing both the employer's liabilities and expenses
for such benefits. Similar actions are expected to be taken by
government employers as they deal with GASB 45.
In situations where government employers may be considering
plan redesign, the focus will typically be on preserving as much as
possible the expectations of present retirees, while allowing the
greatest changes to affect new future hires. While there is usually
much more flexibility to change retiree benefits for new employees,
public sector unions and the relevant labor laws may influence the
government employer's ability to change its retiree benefits (Moran,
2010). The power of government employees and their unions in
particular has been shown to be an important factor influencing
governments' decisions regarding retiree benefits (McKethan et al.,
2006). In some jurisdictions, unions are strong and can prevent
unilateral action by the government employer. Other jurisdictions
may be similarly constrained if their OPEB have constitutional,
statutory, or judicial status that precludes or limits what governments
can do, especially for retirees and incumbent employees.
Building the Assets Base: Should the Government Ennployer Prefund?
A key component of GASB 45 is the option of prefunding OPEB.
Doing so provides a vehicle for building an asset base to offset the
actuarial accrued liabilities and pay for the benefits as they come due
in the future. The growth of the assets, theoretically, provides greater
benefit security for retirees (Young, 2005) as more revenues into the
plan, over time, come from investment income. The new OPEB
reporting standards do not require that the OPEB be prefunded or
that funds be held in trust. However, prefunding and setting up an
irrevocable trust are recommended best practices for local
governments implementing GASB 45 (Coe & Rivenbank, 2010).
Government employers can choose to continue to address their
OPEB on a PAYGO basis. But there are long-term consequences of
doing so, in that the OPEB liability and net obligation for the employer
will continue to grow unchecked. With the PAYGO approach "the

CHADQiriQ ATID/OR FUMDirtQ OTHER POST-EMPLOYMEriT BENEFITS PROMISES

377

expensing is only out of pocket so there is not assistance against the
accruing liability" (Bell, 2006, p. 34). However, there are significant
obstacles to OPEB prefunding. For most employers the ARC payment
is a large multiple of the PAYGO amount. Depending on the size of
the OPEB plan, advance funding under the GASB 45 rules may add
fiscal stress to the governmental entity (Young, 2005).^ Prefunding,
because it usually involves higher short-term costs compared with
PAYGO, may introduce additional financial obligations at an
inopportune time. This may prompt a reconsideration of OPEB levels
instead of prefunding existing levels of benefits (Wiesnewski, 2005).
A Four-ceil Typology of Government Responses to GASB 45
GASB 45 provides government employers with an understanding
of their OPEB actuarial liability, which may raise the important issue
of how to manage that liability (Young, 2005). The UAAL depends
both on the promises to employees and the assets designed to fund
these promises. Governments can respond to GASB 45 by focusing
on both sides of the equation, by (1) changing benefits (i.e., the OPEB
promises made to employees) and/or (2) building the OPEB assets
needed to provide the benefits.
Government responses to addressing the OPEB liabilities that
result from compliance with GASB 45 can be organized into a fourcell typology. This typology categorizes government responses based
on two dimensions (see Figure 1). The first dimension is the OPEB
promise made to employees. Government employers can either
maintain the same OPEB promise as before implementation of GASB
45, or reduce or eliminate benefits.2 The second dimension pertains
to the assets and funding of OPEB. Here, governments also have two
options, either to continue funding OPEB on a PAYGO basis, or to
prefund OPEB. The four cells of the typology include a combination of
these two dimensions. First, governments could maintain the status
quo and make no changes to their OPEB benefits or to their PAYGO
approach to funding OPEB (cell 1).
Alternatively, government
employers could prefund their OPEB and continue to provide the
same OPEB benefits (cell 2). The remaining two response options
both involve reductions in benefits, whether funding via PAYGO (cell
3) or by prefunding (cell 4). As the next section illustrates, local
governments' response to GASB 45 are spread across these different
categories.
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FIGURE 1
Four-Cell Typology of Government Employers' Responses to GASB 45
and Unfunded OPEB Liabilities
OPEB Promises

PAYGO
approach

Maintain same benefits
as pre-GASB 45

Reduce or eliminate
benefits

1. MAINTAIN STATUS
QUO

3. PAYGO WITH LOWER
BENEFITS

2. PREFUND WITH SAME
BENEFITS

4. PREFUND WITH
LOWER BENEFITS

00
LU
Q.

Prefund
OPEB

HOW HAVE COUNTY GOVERNMENTS RESPONDED TO GASB 45 AND THE
REALIZATION OF THEIR OPEB LIABILITIES?

In 2007, the National Center for the Study of Counties (NCSC)
examined how counties across the country were responding to GASB
45 through case studies of 15 counties (Sanford, 2007). The study's
findings indicate a range of responses, as shown in Appendix 1. Only
a few selected examples from the NCSC study will be highlighted here
to illustrate variations in how the responding counties addressed
GASB 45 and its associated OPEB liabilities.
Fairfax County, Virginia, had an unfunded OPEB liability of $143
million and an ARC of $15.2 million. The county did not make any
changes to its retiree healthcare plan, but instead focused solely on
funding the ARC and creating an OPEB trust. Montgomery County,
Maryland, followed a similar approach. The FY 2008 unfunded
liability was $2.6 billion and the ARC was $240 million. Partly
because 70 percent of its employees are unionized, the county
committed to full funding of the ARC over a 5 year period.
Sonoma County, California, on the other hand, adopted a twopronged strategy: (1) provide personal, professional, and political
recognition of healthcare costs and their importance, and (2) protect
health retirement benefits over the long term by making them
sustainable. This sustainability was defined as a benefit level where
the county could provide services to citizens yet also offer a fair
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compensation package to employees who deliver those services
(Sanford, 2007).
As a result, the county reduced its retiree
healthcare contribution to a more sustainable level.
Gwinnett County, Georgia, also made changes to its OPEB, but
only changed the insurance funding mechanism and not access to
healthcare (Sanford, 2007). County leaders, realizing that their OPEB
liabilities were not sustainable, created an OPEB trust fund to set
aside assets to cover the liabilities and changed from paying a
percentage of the retiree healthcare premium to paying a defined
monthly contribution. This strategy has allowed the county to
essentially lock in its OPEB liabilities at-more manageable levels.
Finally, Chester County, Pennsylvania, had an unfunded OPEB
liability of about $4.4 million, which prompted significant changes to
its OPEB. To limit both exposure to such liabilities and the impact on
taxpayers, the county eliminated the healthcare benefit for
employees retiring after June 30, 2006.
HOW HAVE CITY GOVERNMENTS RESPONDED? EXAMPLES FROM NINE MIDATLANTIC CITIES

To provide a more comprehensive examination of how local
governments have responded to GASB, we supplemented the finding
of the NCSC study with examples of how cities have responded to the
information concerning their liabilities. By combining these examples
of nine Mid-Atlantic cities in Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina
with the fifteen case studies of counties, we are able to better
represent the different types of local governments in the U.S.
Three cities were selected from each of the three states:
Baltimore, Gaithersburg, and Rockville in Maryland; Charlotte,
Fayetteville, and Winston-Salem in North Carolina; and Alexandria,
Richmond, and Virginia Beach in Virginia. These cities were selected
to provide variety in terms of number of retirees, budget size, OPEB
unfunded liability, and ARC. In addition we selected cities from both
right-to-strike (Maryland) and right-to-work (Virginia and North
Carolina) states. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the nine
cities including government net assets, population, per capita
income, UAAL and UAAL per capita. Appendix 2 provides a summary
of the cities' responses to GASB 45. As can be seen from Table 1
and Appendix 2, the cities selected for case study vary widely not only
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in terms of government size and affluence, but also with regard to
OPEB-related characteristics such as the AAL, UAAL and UAAL per
capita, ARC, and number of government retirees. The examples from
the nine selected cities are discussed next.

TABLE 1
OPEB Characteristics of Selected Cities (2008)

City
Richmond, VA

Total Govt
Net Assets
(in
billions)

Alexandria, VA
Virginia Beach, VA
Baltimore, MD
Gaithersburg, MD
Rockville, MD
Charlotte, NC
Fayetteville, NC
Winston-Salem, NC

$2.489
$0.373
$3.093
$4.834
$0.165
$0.271
$7.616
$1.058
$1.413

Population

200,123
141,000
434,072
637,455
59,912
63,170
695,995
181,453
224,889

Per Capita
Income

UAAL
(million)

UAAL Per
Capita

$39,860
$76.0
$379.77
$65,141
$150.5 $1,067.38
$43,578
$127.7
$292.74
$32,445 $2,150.0 $3,161.01
$69,985
$18.0
$300.44
$53,754
$160.46
$10.1
$229.7
$330.03
$24,858
$28.0
$149.33
$34,245
$79.0
$351.28
$35,666

Analysis of the cities' responses to GASB 45 and its informational
content was based on examination of their respective comprehensive
annual financial reports (FY 2006 through FY 2010) and other
government documents. Data from FY 2006 through FY 2008 were
used to determine how the cities responded to the implementation of
GASB 45. Follow-up information using data for FY 2009 and FY 2010
was used to update the cities' responses. City finance and budget
directors were also surveyed to obtain information about compliance
with GASB 45 and its impact on OPEB provision.
Richmond, Virginia

Of all the cities studied, Richmond, Virginia, had adopted the
most proactive strategy to reduce its unfunded liability. The city's
original UAAL was $194 million, which prompted the city to make
significant changes to its retiree healthcare program. This reduced
the liability by almost $120 million to $76 million. The most
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significant change was to eliminate the Medicare subsidy provided to
its retirees. This was accomplished by enrolling retirees in the
Medicare Advantage program instead of keeping them on the OPEB
plan. Second, all employees hired after January 1, 1997, were
moved into a DC retiree healthcare plan (in the form of a HSA), and
those employees receive no retiree healthcare in the future. Finally,
for current retirees and employees hired prior to January 1,1997, the
city froze its retiree healthcare contributions at the 2007 levels. By
aggressively redesigning the OPEB, Richmond was able to
significantly reduce and limit its OPEB liability. The city decided not to
set up a trust fund to prefund the remaining benefits promised to
their pre-1997 employees, but did set aside (in 2008) $650,000
towards future OPEB costs. In 2009 and 2010 the city set aside $1.4
million per year towards its OPEB liability. This amount was
significantly less than the ARC and is roughly equal to the normal cost
component of the ARC.
Alexandria, Virginia

The City of Alexandria, Virginia, decided to continue to provide
retiree healthcare and to prefund the liability. This was accomplished
by creating an OPEB trust fund and making an initial deposit of $5.6
million in 2008 as well as identifying an additional $10.7 million from
the ending General Fund balance from FY 2008 for deposit into the
trust fund. The city made several changes to its employee healthcare
plan, which affected retirees, as they participate in the employee
healthcare plan. The city's monthly contribution is a fixed $260 per
person toward the healthcare premium and the remaining balance is
the responsibility of the retiree. Healthcare premiums were increased
by 3.3 percent in FY 2007, and this increase was borne solely by
retirees. In addition, retiree healthcare for employees hired after
September 30, 2007, will be prorated based on the length of service.
While not related to retiree healthcare, the city also decided that
employees hired after July 1, 2008 would not receive the retiree life
insurance benefit that had been previously provided. This had the
effect of lowering the overall OPEB liability for the city. The city's most
recent actuarial valuation was on December 31, 2009 and at that
time the OPEB trust fund was valued at $8.2 million and the AAL was
$90.7 million (resulting in an UAAL of $82.5 million which is a funding
ratio of 9%). This was after the city made the full ARC payment for
both 2009 and 2010.
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Virginia Beach, Virginia
The City of Virginia Beach decided that it would continue to
provide retiree healthcare and that it would prefund the OPEB and
establish a trust fund. In 2007 the city created an Employee Benefits
Review Task Force, whose members represented City Council, city
employees, public safety employees, and citizens and business
owners. The Task Force developed an overall strategy of reducing the
unfunded retiree healthcare liability and, to the extent practical,
funding the ARC. Recommendations made by the task force became
effective in FY 2009. The city's first ARC was made on June 30,
2008, in the amount of $10.3 million. The city has contributed 100
percent of the ARC into the trust fund for all fiscal years since
implementation of GASB 45.
Reducing the OPEB liability involved significant changes to the
OPEB promises. First, length of service necessary for retiree health
insurance eligibility was increased from 5 years to 25 years. Second,
the city shifted more costs to employees, in the form of reduced
employer subsidies and increased employee co-pays, déductibles,
and out-of-pocket maximums. The city eliminated the zero premium
(i.e., 100% employer subsidy) healthcare option for single subscriber
retirees, in addition to introducing a graduated subsidy plan capped
at 50 percent. In FY 2010 the city offered employees the option to
switch from the current DB plan to a DC plan with a HSA. However,
limited enrollment in the HSA option indicates that it is unlikely to
substantially reduce the unfunded liability.
Baltimore, Maryland
Baltimore has, by far, the largest liability of the cities included in
this study. Maryland is a right-to-strike state, and Baltimore has
union contracts that made it impossible for the city to consider
changing or eliminating its OPEB to reduce the liability. Given the size
of the UAAL ($2 billion for the city and its school system combined),
carrying an unfunded liability of that magnitude on the financial
disclosure and reporting documents could have a negative effect on
the city's bond ratings. Therefore prefunding was the only option, and
in FY 2008 the city established an OPEB trust fund and contributed
$183.3 million. This represented $18.7 million more than the ARC
and was an increase of $78.6 million over the previous year's PAYGO
amount. For FY 2009 the city contributed $142.3 million to the OPEB
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trust fund ($37 million less than the ARC). For FY 2010 the city again
contributed $142.3 million to the OPEB trust fund (the ARC was
$203.7 million). Despite the prefunding strategy, as of June 30,
2010, the UAAL for the city of Baltimore was $2.6 billion, an increase
of $415 million since June 30, 2008.
Gaithersburg, Maryland
Gaithersburg, Maryland, adopted a proactive strategy,
implementing GASB 45 a year earlier than required. The city decided
to prefund its existing OPEB with no plan changes. The city pays
85percent of the retiree's health and dental premiums as well as
lOOpercent of the life insurance premiums. An employee must have
at least 15 years of service to qualify for the OPEB. In FY 2007, the
city established an OPEB trust fund with an initial deposit of $2.6
million (over two and a half times the ARC). However in subsequent
years (FY 2008 through FY 2010) the city's contribution to the trust
fund was significantly below the ARC: 32 percent, 47percent, and
lOpercent of the ARC, respectively. According to the most recent
actuarial valuation of the OPEB plan (completed July 1, 2009), the
AAL was $24.9 million and the UAAL was $22.9 million.
Rockville, Maryland
The City of Rockville, Maryland, faced a very small OPEB liability,
primarily because in order to qualify for the benefit, retirees must be
at least 60 years old with ten years of service. This has had the effect
of minimizing the "window" within which the retiree will receive OPEB
before being eligible for Medicare at age 65. Because the benefits
were already minimal, the city decided to make no plan changes. In
2009 the city established a trust fund and made the full ARC
payment of $1.3 million. However, in the following year the city
funded only $237,000 of the $1.4 million ARC.
Charlotte, North Carolina
Prior to GASB 45, the City of Charlotte, North Carolina, offered a
modest OPEB in which retirees with at least 15 years of service were
eligible for the healthcare plan and the city subsidized 85 percent of
the premium. Employees who retired with at least ten but less than
15 years of service were allowed to participate in the plan but had to
pay the full premium. Those with less than ten years of service
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received no benefits. With the implementation of GASB 45, no
changes to those eligibility and participation requirements were
made. Instead, the city adopted an aggressive prefunding strategy
and focused on building the asset base needed to pay for future
benefits.
In FY 2008, the city established a trust fund and made a payment
of $28.4 million (166% of the ARC). For 2009 and 2010 the city
contributed 195 percent and 104 percent of the ARC payment,
respectively. The most recent actuarial valuation (as of July 1, 2009)
was $174 million, which suggests that the aggressive prefunding
strategy has been able to reduce the OPEB unfunded liability.
Fayetteville, North Carolina
The City of Fayetteville, North Carolina, decided to continue to
offer healthcare coverage to its retirees, but has made changes to the
healthcare plan in an effort to reduce OPEB liabilities. For employees
hired after February 1, 2008, eligibility to participate in the retiree
healthcare plan is based on 20 years of credible service. This is a
considerable increase from the previous requirement of only 5 years
of service. In addition, retirees will only be able to carry a dependent
on the plan if that dependent was on the plan for the consecutive five
years prior to retirement, and the dependent must pay the full
premium.
However, the city has not yet decided whether to prefund the
liability, and as of June 2010, the city was still using PAYGO. Despite
continuing with the PAYGO approach and not prefunding, the city has
seen a reduction in its UAAL, from $28 million in 2008 to $15 million
in 2009, which could be largely due to changes to the plan.
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
The City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, also decided to
continue to provide retiree healthcare, while adopting an aggressive
prefunding strategy. In January 2008 the city established an OPEB
trust fund with $34.8 million (44.1% of the UAAL). In subsequent
years (FY 2009 and 2010) the city contributed 100 percent of the
ARC amount.
The city also made plan changes to reduce its liability. For
example, the city increased the required number of credible service
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years to 15. Dependents will be allowed on the plan only if they pay
the full group rate premium. For those retirees who qualify for the
OPEB, the city limited its annual contribution to $2,400 per retiree,
with increases in premiums, co-pays, and déductibles beyond this
amount to be covered by the retiree. As of the most recent actuarial
valuation on January 1, 2010, the OPEB liability was almost halffunded (48.5%), as the AAL was $80.6 million, and plans assets were
valued at $39.1 million.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The examples discussed in this paper show that local
governments have responded to GASB 45 using a combination of
strategies. The findings of the NCSC study of counties and the case
studies of nine mid-Atlantic cities indicate that local governments
have responded to GASB 45 and the knowledge of the magnitude of
their OPEB liabilities in four different ways (see Figure 2). Improving
the asset base appears to be a popular response to reducing the
unfunded liability with almost 70 percent of the cities and counties
included in this study taking steps to prefund their OPEB. However,
some local governments (43.5%) have also responded by reducing or
eliminating retiree healthcare.
As illustrated in this paper, coming to grips with the OPEB
unfunded liabilities has resulted in some local governments not only
reconsidering their OPEB plan designs, but also contemplating
eliminating their OPEB. While the. severity of plan redesign and
possible discontinuation of OPEB plan offerings by government
employers will typically depend on the magnitude of the unfunded
liability, the current fiscal environment facing governments is such
that even those cities with smaller OPEB liabilities may consider
reducing or eliminating their OPEB as a way to reduce future liabilities
and outgoing cash flows.
Several authors and studies have suggested measures for
governments to manage their OPEB liabilities. For example, Russell
(2008) suggested several approaches to controlling OPEB liabilities,
including the following:
- Modifying the cost-sharing philosophy by requiring retirees to pay
an increased share.
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FIGURE 2
OPEB Liabilities in Four Different Ways
OPEB Promises

Prefund OPEB

PAYGO approacl

Maintain same benefits as preGASB 45

Reduce or eliminate benefits

Maintain Status Quo
Counties:
Mecklenburg, NC; Multnomah,
OR

PAYGO with Lower Benefits
Counties:
Chester, PA; Marathon, Wl
Cities:
Fayetteville, NC; Richmond, VA

Prefund with Same Benefits
Counties:
Clark, NV; Fairfax, VA;
Hillsborough, FL; Harris, TX;
Montgomery, MD; Oakland, Ml
Cities:
Baltimore, MD; Charlotte, NC;
Gaithersburg, MD;
Rockville, MD

Prefund with Lower Benefits
Counties:
Gwinnet, GA; Shelby, TN; Sonoma,
CA
Cities:
Alexandria, VA; Virginia Beach, VA;
Winston-Salem, NC

Note: Tulsa, OK was included in the NCSC study of county responses but is
not included in this summary figure because the county does not offer a
DB OPEB plan. Bernalillo, NM was also not included because its retirees
participate in the state retiree health plan and the county has no
liability.

- Increasing eligibility requirements for receiving benefits or
reducing benefits if retirement occurs after a certain date.
- Limiting employer liability exposure by reducing duration of
coverage, capping employer annual claims costs per retiree, and
capping employer aggregate costs, or introducing DC plans.
- Modifying benefit designs such as changes to deductible, copayments, co-insurance, and out-of-pocket limits.
- Other cost management strategies such as switching retirees to
Medicare advantage and Medicare supplement plans.
Examples of how these approaches have been implemented by
counties and cities in this study are presented in Table 2.

CHATtQmQ ATID/OR FUMDiriQ OTHER POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS PROMISES

387

TABLE 2
Strategies and Approaches for Reducing Benefits
Strategy/Approach

Example

Modifying the Cost-Sharing Philosophy
- Different subsidies for
Winston-Salem: Dependents pay full premium.
retirees vs. dependents
Charlotte: Employees with 15 years of service
-Linking retiree
contributions to years of are allowed to participate in the healthcare plan
and the city pays 85 percent of the premium.
service
Employees who retire with at least ten but less
than 15 years of service are allowed to
participate in the plan but must pay the full
premium.
Increasing Eligibility Requirements for Receiving Benefits or Reducing
Benefits If Retirement Occurs after a Certain Date
Fayettevile: 20 years of credible service
- Increasing eligibility
required for a retiree to participate in the
requirements for
healthcare plan.
receiving benefits
- Reducing benefits if
Chester County: Eliminate the healthcare
retirement occurs after a benefit for employees retiring after June 30,
certain date
2006
Limiting Employer Liability Exposure
- Limiting employer annual Winston-Salem: Limit the annual contribution to
costs per retiree
$2,400 per retiree, with increases in premiums,
co-pays and déductibles beyond this amount to
be covered by the retiree.
Richmond: For current retirees and employees
-Capping employer
hired prior to January 1, 1997, the city froze its
aggregate costs
contributions to retiree healthcare at the 2007
levels.
Virginia Beach: Provide employees the option of
-Introducing DC plans
switching from the current DB plan to a HSA (DC
plan).
-Changingdéductibles, co- Virginia Beach: Increase retiree co-pays,
payments, co-insurance, déductibles and out-of-pocket maximums.
and/or out-of-pocket
limits
-Switching retirees to
Richmond: Enroll retirees in Medicare
Medicare supplement
Advantage program.
plans
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This Study utilized a sample of 15 counties (from across the
country) and nine Mid-Atlantic cities as the basis of the analysis of
local government responses to GASB 45 and its informational
contents regarding OPEB liabilities. The counties and cities varied in
terms of size, measured as population, government net assets, and
government workforce and retirees. Furthermore, the cities and
counties represent both urban and rural areas, and right-to-work and
right-to-strike states. While the cities are all from the mid-Atlantic
region, there is no reason to believe that their responses to GASB 45
are driven by regional factors, particularly since many of their
responses are similar to those of the counties. This suggests that the
findings are, with some degree of confidence, generalizable to local
governments throughout the country.
Implications
The goal of this paper was to highlight the variety of ways that
local governments have responded to knowledge about their OPEB
liabilities, and to show that some of these measures have resulted in
reduced benefits for government employees. The next paragraphs
discuss the implications of these responses to GASB 45.
Clearly, the accounting and reporting standards of GASB 45
have serious implications for government employers. Clark (2008)
argued that GASB 45 serves as "an important tool for policymakers
and stakeholders in determining future compensation and
employment policies and tax policies" (p. 3). In complying with GASB
45, governments are able to generate information about OPEB that is
useful to policymakers, investors, and other stakeholders. While in
the beginning GASB 45 may introduce staggering liabilities to
government employers' balance sheets, "in the longer term, it might
bring into sharper focus for both the electorate and elected officials
the fact that massive financial commitments have been made to
public employees that will be progressively more difficult to meet"
(Hurley et al., 2006, p. w203). Furthermore, information resulting
from compliance with GASB 45 may shed light on instances where
current and future funding of OPEB would strain a government's
operations or where conditions are such that governments are unable
to fulfill their OPEB obligations (Bell, 2006).
In the recent ICMA Survey of Local Government Employee Health
Insurance Programs (ICMA, 2007), cities and counties were asked
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the amount of their OPEB liabilities. Interestingly, 26 percent of
respondents were not sure of their estimated OPEB liabilities. Clearly,
the reporting requirements of GASB 45 are needed to ensure that
those cities and counties are aware of the future funding needed to
ensure that they can keep the promises made to their employees and
retirees. As McKethan et al. (2006) suggested, "GASB 45 is an
important and needed contribution to public accounting and oversight
that will help ensure that public officials will take the future costs of
such programs into account when setting retiree benefits and
premiums" (p. 1523). It can be argued that the costs associated with
reduced benefits are a reasonable tradeoff for the increased
confidence of knowing that the needed assets have been put aside to
deliver on those promises. For government employees, despite
possibly experiencing reductions in OPEB, there is greater security in
knowing that the retiree benefits retained will be more fully
accounted for and better funded.
It is also important to note that GASB 45 may not entirely be at
fault for the reduction in retiree healthcare benefits.
Beyond
disclosing the liabilities and costs of governments' OPEB, GASB 45
does not require governments to take any actions to manage their
OPEB liabilities. Therefore, the resulting changes in benefits should
not be blamed entirely on GASB 45. In many instances, the effect on
OPEB of GASB 45 cannot be differentiated from other economic and
fiscal factors;
Clark (2008) argued that most government OPEB plans are
regularly amended, as government employers periodically increase
premiums, raise déductibles, increase co-payments, restrict choices,
or raise eligibility criteria. Wiesnewski (2005, p. 118) suggested that
implementation of GASB 45 is "less likely to influence the employer's
decision to continue to provide such benefits than other strong
economic factors such as significant continued healthcare cost
inflation and a continued deterioration in the active-to-retiree
workforce ratio in state government employment." In the face of the
current fiscal crisis, it would not be surprising if more and more state
and local governments turn to benefit plan redesign as a means of
reducing their overall OPEB liabilities, not because of GASB 45 but
because of economic pressures. Therefore, when coupled with
factors such as the growth in medical and healthcare costs and the
decreasing ratio of active employees to retirees in the public sector.
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GASB 45 may result in local governments reducing their OPEB in
order to avoid additional liabilities.
Finally, GASB 45 may also have implications for how governments
think about their other unfunded liabilities. The Cobalt Community
Research survey (2009) asked respondents whether their GASB 45
and OPEB experiences had heightened their awareness of other longterm liabilities. A majority (59%) of respondents answered in the
affirmative; 27 percent indicated that GASB 45 has increased their
awareness of other similar liabilities and had prompted them to begin
planning for these liabilities. The other 32 percent, while being more
aware, were insufficiently concerned about the liabilities to begin
planning for them.
Even while government employers deal with issues arising from
the information provided through the implementation of GASB 45,
several other concerns must also be addressed. Surrounding the
overarching questions of whether to prefund (and the potential fiscal
impact of higher contributions associated with prefunding) and
whether the existing benefit structure will be maintained are key
issues such as (1) the extent to which any decreases in benefits
undercut government's competitive ability to hire needed employees;
(2) the affordability of prefunding; (3) the political hazards associated
with addressing OPEB liabilities; (4) legal issues associated with
OPEB levels and the possible reductions in such levels; and (5) the
effect on bond ratings of decisions to address OPEB liabilities (Young,
2005). These questions were not addressed in this study. However,
as more local and state governments are forced to come to grips with
their OPEB plans and the associated liabilities, these issues will come
increasingly to the forefront of policy discussion. These issues
provide ample opportunity for continued future research on the
financial, human resources, and political implications of GASB 45 and
the recent realization by government employers of their OPEB
liabilities.
NOTES
1.

It may have been the absence of both the equivalent standards
(to GASB 45) and the greater disclosure and transparency
resulting from such standards that precipitated the underlying
financial problems. However, the additional financial pressures
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associated with making the ARC payments could contribute to
substantial additional stress.
2. While it is possible that another option would be to increase OPEB
benefit levels, existing concern over sustainability of OPEB
promises suggest that it is unlikely that government employers
will raise benefits.
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APPENDIX 1
Summary Information for Counties in the NCSC Study<a'
Government Response to GASB 4 5 and
AAL
ARC
Employment Information About OPEB
($million) ($million)
FTE
Liabilities
County
• County participates in the
state retiree healthcare
Bernalillo,
n/a
1,608
NM
n/a
program and has no liability
• County already offered HSA,
so only have minimal liability
due to implicit rate subsidies
• Retirees have access to
county health plan but pay
100% of premiums
1
n/a
n/a
Tulsa, OK
• Eliminated healthcare
benefits for employees
4
1
2,290
Chester, PA
retiring after June 30, 2006
• County already offered HSA,
Marathon,
so only have minimal liability
due to implicit rate subsidies
Wl
5
0.1
838
• Cost-allocate the ARC across
the department as part of the
Hillsbocost of each FTE
rough, FL
100
8.2
10,429
• PAYGO for 2008
Multnomah,
12.7
• No plan changes
110
4,281
OR
" Switched from a DB plan to a
DC plan
• Created a locally controlled
Gwinnett,
OPEB trust and pension plan
GA
4,586
140
13.6
• No changes to benefits as the
county recognizes that OPEBs
are important
Mecklenrecruitment/retention tools
4,282
burg, NC
141
14.6
• Focus on funding the ARC
• Created OPEB trust fund
Fairfax, VA
143
15.2
10,999 • No changes to health plans
• Significantly reduced retiree
benefits package for new
employees
• No changes for current
employees
6,277
267
28.2
Shelby, TN
• Partially funding ARC
Clark, NV
372
49.7
18,705 • No changes to health plan
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APPENDIX 1 (Continued)
Government Response to GASB 45 and
AAL
ARC
Employment Information About OPEB
County
($million) ($million)
FTE
Liabilities
• Reduced employer contribution to the healthcare
Sonoma, CA
382
37.2
4,154
premium
• Has been prefunding OPEB
since 1980s and full AAL is
advance funded
Oakland, Ml
830
60.2
4,536
• Introduced HSA
• Significantly reduced retiree
benefits package for new
employees
• No changes for current
Harris, TX
834
90.0
employees
15,840
• Full funding of ARC
Montgomery,
implemented over a five year
MD
2,600
240.0
9,089
period
Notes: Information about the numberof government retirees is not available.
Source: Research by the National Center for the Study of Counties (Sanford
2007).
APPENDIX 2
Summary Information for Selected Cities (2008)
Govt
Response to GASB 45
AAL
ARC
Govt
Employees and Information about
($mlllion) ($million) Retirees
(FTE)
OPEB Liabilities
•Phasing out OPEB
Richmond,
through significant plan
VA(a)
76.1
4.6
1,172
8,940
changes
• Established OPEB Trust
Fund with initial deposit
of $5.5 million
Alexandria,
• Increased employee
VA(a)
88.1
17.9
premiums
1,015
4,472
• Established OPEB Trust
Fund and made the ARC
payment
Virginia
•Changed plan for
Beach, VA
84.7
10.3
574
retirees and employees
6,762
City
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APPENDIX 2 (Continued)

Response to GASB 45
Govt
AAL
ARC
Govt
Employees and Information about
($million) ($million) Retirees
(FTE)
OPEB Liabilities
• Established OPEB Trust
Fund with ARC plus
$18.7 million
Baltimore, 214,454
28,171 • No changes to plans
.0
164.6 21,017
MD(ä>
• Established OPEB trust
fund with an initial
deposit of 250% of ARC
Gaithers27
363
•No changes to plan
9.7
0.9
burg, MD
• Established OPEB trust
fund with ARC payment
Rockville,
18
535
•No changes to plan
MD
8.8»':'
1.3
• Established OPEB Trust
Fund with initial deposit
of 166% of the ARC
Charlotte,
• No changes to health
6,577
229.7
17.0
1,895
NC
plans
•Set aside less than $ 1
million towards liability
Fayette1,996
28.0
6.6
436
•Made plan changes
ville, NC
• Established OPEB Trust
Fund with initial deposit
of $34.8 million (44% of
UAAL)
Winston•Made plan changes
1,056
2,660
Salem, NC
79.1
$6.98

City

Notes: (a) Figures are for city government
combined.
(b) As of January 1, 2009.

and school

district
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